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Advancing technology provides the impetus for a battle between two
of society's competing interests: (1) the effective enforcement of its laws,
and (2) the privacy of its individual members. Many new technological
developments present, on one hand, an opportunity for government offi-
cials to upgrade the available means to preserve a peaceful, law-abiding
society. On the other hand, modern technology presents the frightening
possibility that the government will strip its citizens of their personal
privacy.
Air travel, although no longer new technology, has become the
arena for a relatively new fourth amendment battle over use of the skies
for warrantless aerial surveillance. Does a person's constitutional "right
to privacy" protect his property from aerial observation by police who
act without a judicially issued search warrant? While a few state and
federal courts have ruled on the issue of admissibility of evidence ob-
tained by warrantless aerial surveillance, the issue is relatively unex-
plored.' The United States Supreme Court was silent with regard
to warrantless aerial surveillance until 1986 when the Court decided
California v. Ciraolo2 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.3
1. State court decisions appeared in appreciable numbers in the early 1970's, while important
federal district court and court of appeals cases appeared in greater numbers in the early 1980's. See
Note, The EPA's Use of Aerial Photography Violates the Fourth Amendment: Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 15 CONN. L. REv. 327 (1983); Comment, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth
Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271 (1981); Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1984); Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance After
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical: The Omniscient Eye in the Sky, 18 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 285 (1986):
Comment, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 725 (1985); Note, California v. Ciraolo: Has Backyard Privacy Gone to Pot?, 18
PAC. L.J. 1003 (1987); Comment, Open Air Searches and Enhanced Surveillance in California, 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779 (1981); Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance of Private Residence's
Curtilage From Altitude of 1000 Feet Does Not Implicate Fourth Amendment, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J.
561 (1986); Note, In Plane View: Is Aerial Surveillance a Violation of the Fourth Amendment? Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 40 Sw. L.J. 1133 (1986); Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Warrant-
less Aerial Surveillance, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 309 (1983); Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance:
A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1982).
2. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
3. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
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Faced with the issue of admissibility of evidence found in a warrant-
less aerial search, courts apply established fourth amendment tests as
well as several relatively new factors which have emerged from state and
federal court decisions. Using this analysis, aerial surveillance which is
controlled by proper guidelines can withstand judicial scrutiny and can
be used to greatly enhance the capabilities of law enforcement officials
without invading the privacy of United States citizens.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY INTERESTS
A. The Boundaries of Fourth Amendment Protection
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
persons the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.4
The meaning of "unreasonable," however, has long been a subject of de-
bate and change. Early American case law first determined the bounda-
ries of this constitutional protection according to property law and tort
law guidelines.5 Under this approach, certain "areas" were beyond the
limits of a legitimate government search.6 Therefore, a physical invasion
or trespass into one of the protected areas constituted a violation of the
fourth amendment.7
As fourth amendment protection developed, the courts determined
that there were three basic areas of property which should be afforded
varying degrees of protection: the dwelling, the curtilage, and the open
field. The dwelling and the curtilage received the greatest amount of pro-
tection, while the open field received virtually no protection from govern-
ment intrusion. Justice Holmes in Hester v. United States' stated that
the open field is not afforded protection from unreasonable searches
under the fourth amendment.9 In Hester, the petitioner was convicted of
violating prohibition laws; officers viewed the petitioner's illegal activity
from an open field owned by the petitioner."t In reaching his conclusion,
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ.
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
5. See Note, California v. Ciraolo: Has Backyard Privacy Gone to Pot?, 18 PAc. L.J. 1003,
1011 (1987) (analysis of development of the fourth amendment's searches and seizures clause).
6. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
7. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
8. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
9. Id. at 59.
10. Id. at 58.
[Vol. 23:259
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Holmes stated that open fields are not contained in the fourth amend-
ment phrase "persons, houses, papers and effects" and that the distinc-
tion between houses and open fields is "as old as the common law."" t
Unlike the open field, the fourth amendment 12 expressly protects the
dwelling, and the Supreme Court has extended this protection to the cur-
tilage, as articulated in Oliver v. United States.'3 In Oliver, the Court
defined curtilage as "the area to which extends the intimate activity asso-
ciated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life', and
therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes."' 4 The Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn i set out
four factors which determine whether an area is curtilage: 16 "[1] proxim-
ity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to
protect the area from observation by people passing by."17 If an area
meets these four requirements, it is likely that the area will fall "under
the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection."' 8
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis Based on Property and Tort Principles
English common law influenced both the writing of the United
States Constitution and the theory behind property-based fourth amend-
ment boundaries.'9 A violation of individual privacy at common law re-
quired an actual, physical trespass.2° In the late 18th Century, an
English court in Entick v. Carrington2 held that surveillance using only
the eye or ear, unaccompanied by physical trespass, could not violate the
privacy of another.22 An American case, Olmstead v. United States,23
used the common-law doctrines to find a telephone line wiretapping con-
stitutional. The court determined that the wiretapping was permissible
11. Id.
12. See supra note 4 for the text of U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
14. Id. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (citation omitted).
15. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
16. Id. at 1139.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 409, 412 (1982).
20. Id. at 411-14. Comment, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Cur-
tainsfor the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 730-34 (1985).
21. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), cited in Comment, supra note 19, at 412.
22. See Comment, supra note 19, at 412.
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
1987]
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because the telephone lines were tapped without any trespass on the de-
fendant's property.24 Fourteen years later, in Goldman v. United
States, 5 the Supreme Court upheld a search where a listening device was
placed against the wall in one room in order to overhear the conversa-
tions in the adjacent office. In Goldman, as in Olmstead, the Court based
its decision solely on whether the government had physically trespassed
onto the defendant's property. 6
C. Modern Fourth Amendment Analysis
In 1961, the Supreme Court began to alter what it viewed as a con-
stitutionally protected area. In Silverman v. United States, 7 the Court
bypassed the strict trespass requirement by ruling that the use of a "spike
mike" was unconstitutional because it was an "unauthorized physical
penetration" onto the defendant's premises. 28 Although no government
official physically trespassed into Silverman's home, police officers lis-
tened to conversations throughout the house with a spike mike, which
was driven through the wall of the building until it contacted a heating
duct.2 9 The Supreme Court found that the use of the spike mike was
constitutionally distinct from the listening device used in Goldman, be-
cause the mike actually penetrated a constitutionally protected area, and
because "Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in
terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.",30 Silverman marks
the initial departure from a period of property-based fourth amendment
analysis into an era of objectively testing a person's privacy interests.
The Supreme Court first articulated an objective standard of privacy
expectations in Katz v. United States.31 In Katz, FBI agents attached a
listening device to a telephone booth to record a telephone conversa-
tion.3 2 The information obtained from the telephone conversation was
admitted at trial over the objections of the petitioner, who was convicted
24. Id. at 464. The Court in Olmstead stated that there was no search or seizure in that only
the sense of hearing was involved, and no entry was made on defendant's property. Id.
25. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
26. Id. at 134.
27. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
28. Id. at 509. A spike mike includes a microphone with a spike about a foot long attached to
it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The "mike" was used to hear conversa-
tions inside a dwelling by driving it through a wall until it made contact with a good sounding board.
By making contact with a heating duct which ran throughout the house, officers were able to hear
conversations anywhere in the house. Id. at 506-07.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 511.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. Id. at 348.
[Vol. 23:259
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of illegally transferring wagering information by telephone.33 The gov-
ernment argued that there had been no violation of the fourth amend-
ment because there was no physical penetration or trespass of the phone
booth.
Disregarding the government's trespass argument, the Supreme
Court applied a new standard of review and concluded that the petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy that his telephone conversation
would not be overheard, even when using a public telephone.35 In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Harlan further defined the new standard of re-
view to include a determination of whether an individual's expectation of
privacy is legitimate: 36 the person must have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy, and the individual's expectation must be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 37 This new rule, how-
ever, recognized that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is
not subject to fourth amendment protection.38 In abrogating the "pro-
tected areas" rationale, the Court in Katz stated that the fourth amend-
ment protects people, not places. 39 Thus, the Supreme Court set up a
new standard of review based upon an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.'
D. Remnants of Protected Areas Theory Still in Effect
Because the Supreme Court still draws a distinction between open
fields and curtilage, some remnants of the property-based system re-
main.41 While open fields receive no fourth amendment protection from
government searches, curtilage retains its status as an area afforded great
protection by the fourth amendment.42 Seventeen years after the deci-
sion in Katz, the Supreme Court upheld this distinction in Oliver v.
United States.43
33. Id.
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id. at 353. The surveillance was limited to the defendant's conversation and did not occur
in an area previously regarded as "protected." Id. at 352-54.
36. Id. at 361.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 351.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 361.
41. See Note, Oliver v. United States: Open Fields and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy,
1985 UTAH L. REV. 463. By saying that the open fields afford no reasonable expectation of privacy,
the Court in Oliver placed the old property-based system back into effect. Id. at 476.
42. See United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987) (Supreme Court upheld search of
barn because barn was not within curtilage of home).
43. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
1987]
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In essence, the Court in Oliver held that the fourth amendment af-
fords no protection to open fields, even under the Katz reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test. In Oliver, narcotics agents, acting on reports that
marijuana was growing on petitioner's farm, walked past "no trespass-
ing" signs and onto petitioner's land to find marijuana growing a mile
from petitioner's home.' The Court held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the outdoors except in property that falls within
the definition of curtilage.45 The Court viewed steps taken by the peti-
tioner to ensure privacy46 as irrelevant in determining petitioner's expec-
tation of privacy.47 A reasonable expectation of privacy is unrelated to
measures taken by the petitioner to hide an illegal activity; the relevant
question was whether the government inspection intruded on the "per-
sonal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."48
Although the Court used the bifurcated Katz test, the decision has
been criticized for allegedly using the former property-based fourth
amendment analysis. Critics view the holding in Oliver, which states that
a person never has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the open field,
as upholding the old property law distinctions. Thus, these critics believe
that Oliver directly conflicts with Katz because Katz represents the end
of property-based fourth amendment analysis.4 9
44. Id. at 173.
45. Id. at 185.
46. In Oliver, petitioner erected locking gates, posted "no trespassing" signs, and planted his
crop in an area shielded by trees.
47. Id. at 182. The court reasoned that steps taken to protect privacy do not always establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy. The court instead stated that legitimacy depends not upon
whether a defendant chooses to conceal his activities, but upon whether the intrusion violates subjec-
tive and societal privacy values inherent in the fourth amendment. Id. at 182-83.
48. Id.
49. But see United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982), affd, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Here the court upheld the compatibility of Katz and Oliver:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is what
protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question re-
quires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited.
Id. at 359-60 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). The court concluded that as
a matter of law any expectation of privacy that landowners have for their open field is not an expec-
tation that society is willing to accept as reasonable. Id. at 360. See also Maine v. Thornton, 104 S.
Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) (upholding the ruling in Oliver and enumerating three critical factors to deter-
mine the degree of intrusion of an open field search: (1) the intent of the framers of the Constitution;
(2) the use to which the land is put; and (3) societal recognition of differing degrees of scrutiny for
different areas).
6
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This criticism is misplaced, however, because the Oliver decision is
clearly compatible with Katz. Open fields do not "provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the [fourth] Amendment is intended to shel-
ter from government interference or surveillance."5 Society has no in-
terest in protecting activities which occur in the open fields and,
therefore, would not view an expectation of privacy in an open field as
reasonable.5 The Court in Oliver also stated that because open fields
"are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office,
or commercial structure would not be," and because "[i]t is not generally
true that fences or 'No Trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields," the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is
not one that society will recognize as reasonable. 2 The Court did recog-
nize a property-based distinction by concluding that open fields are not
protected by the fourth amendment. 3 The Court came to its conclusion,
however, by recognizing that an open field will never meet the second
requirement of the Katz test.
54
Opponents of aerial surveillance argue that allowing aerial searches
will disrupt the privacy of individuals because people will be inhibited
from engaging in private outdoor activities.5 The Supreme Court in
Katz stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."' 56 The proliferation of air travel requires a reasonable person to
realize that at any time a plane or helicopter may fly over his property.
With this in mind, a reasonable person will not engage in activities out of
doors which he desires to keep private if he realizes that the activity
could be detected by observation from the sky.





55. But see Note, Oliver v. United States: Open Fields and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy,
1985 UTAH L. REV. 463. The author states that Oliver is inconsistent with the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy principle because it is possible to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open
field. The author cites solitary walks, agriculture businesses, lovers' meetings, religious worship serv-
ices, and "creative endeavors" as instances where a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy
from aerial surveillance outdoors. Id. at 471-72. See also Note, Oliver v. United States: Will Expec-
tations of Privacy Shield Criminal Acts No More?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1401 (1985).
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
1987]
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III. THE SUPREME COURT BREAKS ITS SILENCE ON WARRANTLESS
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Fourth amendment analysis has progressed so that it now protects
reasonable expectations of privacy, rather than particular areas of prop-
erty. Due to this change in analysis, the Supreme Court has shifted its
focus from determining what property areas are protected to determining
what expectations of privacy are reasonable. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether expectations of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance are reasonable in two cases decided on May 19, 1986: California v.
Ciraolo 57 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.58
A. California v. Ciraolo
Acting on an anonymous telephone tip that Ciraolo was growing
marijuana on his residential property, police attempted to investigate the
area from ground level.59 Two fences completely enclosed the yard and
blocked the officers' view.60 Acting without a search warrant, the police
officers employed a private plane in which they flew over Ciraolo's prop-
erty at an altitude of 1000 feet.61 From the aerial vantage point the of-
ficers viewed marijuana plants growing in Ciraolo's backyard and
photographed the plants with a 35mm camera.62 The officers obtained a
search warrant and seized seventy-three marijuana plants. 63
After the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence of the
search,' the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling
because the property searched was within the curtilage of Ciraolo's
home, where he had a reasonable expectation of privacy from such intru-
sions.65 The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
decision,66 holding that aerial observation of Ciraolo's property was not
57. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
58. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
59. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1810-11.
63. Id. at 1811.
64. Id.
65. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984), rev'd. 106 S.
Ct. 1809 (1986).
66. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986).
[Vol. 23:259
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unreasonable even though the property observed was within the curti-
lage67 of a dwelling.68
Conceding that Ciraolo's marijuana garden was within the curtilage
of his home, the Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case in light of
the test set out in Katz v. United States.69 The majority found that
although Ciraolo may have shown a legitimate subjective expectation of
privacy, his expectation was not one that society would view as reason-
able. 71 Ciraolo had protected his property from ground-level observation
by erecting a ten-foot fence.71 The Court pointed out, however, that a
ten-foot fence might not shield the plants from the eyes of a person
perched on the back of a truck or riding in a two-level bus.7"
Ciraolo challenged the government's right to observe his backyard
from any vantage point, whether ground-level, elevated, or aerial.7 3
However, it was unreasonable for Ciraolo to think that the police would
not use all possible vantage points in their investigation. 4 The fourth
amendment does not require police to shield their eyes when passing a
home; likewise, observations from any place where police have a right to
be is not forbidden. Moreover, in today's society, where air travel is
very common, any person flying over the respondent's home could have
67. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
1819 (1986). The court stated:
The doctrine of curtilage is grounded in the peculiarly strong concepts of intimacy, per-
sonal autonomy and privacy associated with the home. The home is fundamentally a sanc-
tuary, where personal concepts of self and family are forged, where relationships are
nurtured and where people normally feel free to express themselves in intimate ways. The
potent individual privacy interests that inhere in living within a home expand into... [t]he
backyard and area immediately surrounding the home [which] are really extensions of the
dwelling itself.
Id. at 314.
68. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the doctrine of curtilage applies not only to
the home but also to private businesses and commercial buildings. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at
1825; Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In this landmark case, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard for
reasonableness under the fourth amendment. This new standard uses a two-part test to determine
whether a defendant's expectation of privacy is reasonable under the circumstances: (1) the defend-
ant must have shown a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation must be one which
society is willing to accept as reasonable. Id.
70. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811-13.
71. Id. at 1812.
72. Id. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). Police officers used an electronic
beeper to track the defendant to his home. The Court found that the defendant's expectation of
privacy did not extend to his activities within his automobile or to activities outside the dwelling. Id.
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seen the same thing that the officers observed.76 In light of these find-
ings, the Supreme Court ruled that Ciraolo's expectation of privacy from
aerial observation was not an expectation that society would accept as
reasonable. 77
B. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
With Dow Chemical Company's consent, Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) officials conducted an inspection of Dow's 2000-acre
chemical manufacturing facility; Dow denied the EPA's requests for fur-
ther inspection.78 Because extensive security at the facility blocked
ground-level inspection, EPA officials without consent or a search war-
rant employed an aerial photographer who took pictures of the plant at
altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet.79 Company policy provided for
the investigation of low-level flights over the plant. When Dow Chemi-
cal officials learned of the aerial observations, the company brought suit
in federal district court on the ground that the EPA search constituted
an illegal search in violation of the fourth amendment.8" The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Dow Chemical and en-
joined the EPA from disseminating the photographs.81 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,82 and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.83
The Supreme Court found that the 2000-acre plant was more like an
76. Id. at 1813.
77. Id. See also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (arrest as defendant retreated into
her home justified because defendant had been openly identified on her front porch with evidence of
crime just before pursuit); United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.) (plain view doctrine invoked
to justify surveillance of barn which was openly visible from the road), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854
(1982); United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (view of defendant's
scrap metal yard from public road); United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir.) (view of
defendant in front of garage from police car driven into private residential driveway), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985) (observations of
areas within the curtilage are generally permissible, absent measures taken by defendant to conceal
his activities), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987); United States v.
Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Me. 1981) (surveillance of outdoor premises from public vantage
point).
78. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1822 (1986).
79. Id.
80. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d
307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). The trial court held that Dow had manifested a
reasonable expectation of privacy due to its elaborate security measures and due to the "elaborate"
vision-enhancing equipment used by EPA officials. Id. at 1363-69.
81. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819
(1986). The appellate court held that Dow had a legitimate expectation of privacy only from
ground-level searches. Id. at 312.
82. Id. at 315.
83. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
10
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open field 84 than like the curtilage of a dwelling because "[t]he intimate
activities associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage
simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and
buildings of a manufacturing plant."85 The Court also determined that
Dow could not have had a great expectation of privacy because the gov-
ernment has greater latitude in inspecting commercial property than it
does in inspecting private dwellings.86 The Court did not view as signifi-
cant the fact that photographs were taken with a precision mapping cam-
era. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that "the
photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise con-
stitutional concerns."87 In light of these factors, the Court held that the
EPA officials' actions did not constitute an unreasonable search in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment.88
C. Opposition to Warrantless Aerial Surveillance
The dissenting opinions in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical represent the
general opposition to warrantless aerial surveillance. Justice Powell, dis-
senting in both cases, discussed the majority's misplaced reliance on the
notion that air travel has eliminated expectations of privacy from aerial
surveillance.8 9 Powell asserted that while there is a great deal of air
travel today, the likelihood that a passenger on an aircraft will observe
private activities is small and too trivial to recognize.9" Powell stated
that "[t]ravelers on commercial flights, as well as private planes used for
business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting, anony-
mous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings over
84. "Open field" is defined as that area outside the curtilage of a home. Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984). See also Hurwitz v. State, 673 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
("open field" does not need to be open or a field as those terms are used today; fenced, thickly
wooded areas may be open fields), aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 884 (1986); Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. 1985) ("open fields" applies to buildings
and greenhouses apart from and without relation to curtilage). But see United States v. Bassford,
601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987).
The court in Bassford disregarded the distinction between curtilage and noncurtilage because in the
context of an aerial search that distinction is impractical; it is nearly impossible to view one without
viewing the other. Id. at 1331. For a detailed analysis of the open fields doctrine especially in light
of the Katz decision, see Note, Oliver v. United States: Open Fields and Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 463; Note, Oliver v. United States: Will Expectations of Privacy Shield
Criminal Acts No More?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1401 (1985).
85. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
86. Id. at 1826.
87. Id. at 1826-27. See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1827.
89. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1817 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1818.
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which they pass." 9' Justice Powell viewed as unreasonable the fact that
police focus their attention on one area and connect the activities which
occur therein with one particular person.92
Other objections to aerial surveillance are based on a legitimate fear
of overly intrusive searches by aircraft. For example, in National Organi-
zation for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen,93 police overstepped
their authority by invading the personal activities of the owners of the
land instead of inspecting the land for the purposes of finding illegal agri-
cultural pursuits.94 Despite the rareness of abuses like those seen in
Mullen, those who object to aerial surveillance see the airplane as a
"technological advancement" which must be kept totally out of reach of
law enforcement officials.95 These objections, however, focus only on the
possible abuses and not on the advantages gained when aerial surveil-
lance is utilized within strict limitations.
Fears of abusive police power are not new. Police have always had
the potential for abusing their power; however, legislatures and courts
have kept this potential in check. The same checks, when applied to
aerial surveillance, can keep the potential for abuse at a minimum while
allowing police to use aerial surveillance as an investigative tool.
A recent California case demonstrates that when police overstep
their power in using aerial observation, some courts will respond by lim-
iting the use of the illegally obtained evidence. In People v. Sabo,96 police
officers in a helicopter hovering at 400 feet observed marijuana through a
missing roof panel in a greenhouse.97 Because the police operated the
helicopter at a low altitude, and because the defendant displayed a legiti-
mate attempt to block even aerial views of his marijuana plot, the
California Court of Appeal ruled that the surveillance was unconstitu-
tionally intrusive.98 The Sabo case indicates that some courts, while al-
lowing police to use aerial surveillance under proper restrictions, will not
allow police to abuse this power. Because individuals have a decreased
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance of outdoor activities, and
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1819.
93. 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
94. Id. at 957. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
95. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1817 (1986).
96. 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2200 (1987).
97. Id. at 847, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
98. Id. at 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
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because courts will keep aerial surveillance in check, the fourth amend-
ment balancing test must result in favoring the important governmental
and societal interest of crime prevention.
IV. FACTORS USED TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Instead of applying a consistent and concise rule, courts generally
use several factors to evaluate the constitutionality of an aerial search.
While none of these factors are completely determinative, they all have
an effect on the outcome of the decision.99 One group of factors which
the courts address is concerned with the conduct of the surveillance it-
self. These factors include the altitude of the aircraft, 100 the intensity of
the surveillance,0 1 the speed of the aircraft,0 2 and the equipment used
during the surveillance. 103 Other factors which the courts consider are
the location and nature of the property under surveillance," the fre-
quency of other flights over the area, '0 5 measures that the defendant has
used to display his subjective expectation of privacy,'06 evidence of entry
onto the defendant's property by people other than the defendant, 0 7 and
the randomness of the search.
A. Altitude of the Aircraft
The altitude of an airplane from which the property is observed is
one of many factors to consider in determining the constitutional reason-
ableness of aerial surveillance. 1 8 In Dean v. Superior Court for County of
99. For a detailed summary of factors discussed in this comment, as well as other factors such
as concealment by other crops and stolen goods, see Annotation, Aerial Observation or Surveillance
as Violative of Fourth Amendment Guaranty Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 56 A.L.R.
FED. 772, 775-93 (1982).
100. Id. at 780-82.
101. Id. at 783-84.
102. Id. at 783.
103. Id. at 784-85.
104. Id. at 785-90.
105. Id. at 790-91.
106. Id. at 792-93.
107. Id. at 791-92.
108. See Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 115, 110 Cal. Rptr.
585, 587 (1973). The court articulated that sophisticated technology allows detailed surveillance
even at 50,000 feet; therefore, the height of the aircraft involved is only a minor factor. Id. at 116,
110 Cal. Rptr. at 588. See also People v. Lashmett, 71 111. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979)
(sheriff flew over defendant's land at a height of 2400 feet to make observations of stolen farm
equipment; no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance at reasonable heights), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance at reasonable height where officials observed illegal
marijuana plot from helicopter); United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (three
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Nevada, 9 a county sheriff spotted a large green patch on the property
while passing over the land at an altitude of 700 feet.I" The second and
third passes, made at altitudes of 400 and 300 feet, convinced the officer
that the green patch was marijuana."' The defendant filed a petition to
quash his indictment for possession of marijuana on the ground that the
aerial observations violated his fourth amendment rights."12 The court,
in denying the defendant's petition, recognized the fourth amendment's
ever-changing role with regard to increased technology and thus viewed
the low altitude as only a minor factor in determining whether the search
was constitutional." 3
Other courts, however, including the Supreme Court in Dow Chemi-
cal and Ciraolo, have held altitude to be a very important factor in their
determination of constitutionality. These cases seem to suggest that only
searches in navigable airspace are reasonable.' ' The California Court
of Appeal in People v. Sabo 115 created a two-tiered approach to altitude.
If aerial surveillance takes place within navigable airspace, it will be gov-
erned by the holdings in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo."I6 However, if the
surveillance takes place at an altitude below navigable airspace, the court
must evaluate the facts on the basis of a reasonable privacy
expectation."17
separate instances of aerial surveillance from height of 1000 feet which resulted in observation of
marijuana growing in a greenhouse not seen as a search which required a search warrant under the
fourth amendment); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985) (height seen as one
of many factors in determining reasonableness of aerial surveillance; aerial surveillance from a height
of 1000 feet was constitutionally valid when three or four small airports existed nearby), aff'd, 812
F.2d 16 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (two aerial passes made at heights of 200 and 50 feet upheld as constitutional).
But see National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(frequent low flyovers including "buzzings" and "dive bombings" as low as 50 feet in violation of
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy from such activity guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (helicopter which "hovered"
at 20 to 25 feet above defendant's corral unconstitutionally violated defendant's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy).
109. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
110. Id. at 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 115, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
113. Id. at 119, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588-90.
114. The narrow holdings in both Ciraolo and Dow Chemical upheld aerial surveillance as rea-
sonable only when performed in navigable airspace. The public has a right of transit within naviga-
ble airspace as set by Department of Transportation regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. III 1985),
Fixed wing aircraft may not fly below 1000 feet above the highest obstacle in a city, town, or settle-
ment, or below 500 feet above "uncongested" areas. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1987).
115. 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2200 (1987).
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B. Intensity of the Surveillance
In rare cases, courts have found that an aerial search is unreasonable
because of the intensity of the search. In People v. Sneed,'18 the court
held that observations made by a deputy sheriff in a helicopter were un-
reasonable and thus reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful cul-
tivation of marijuana.119 The Sneed court determined that the search
was manifestly "exploratory" in nature because the officers who were
involved in the search had flown the helicopter back and forth over the
defendant's property. 120 Moreover, the officers had flown over the prop-
erty for the sole purpose of finding marijuana and had no other legitimate
purpose in intensifying the search.121
The court in National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Mullen 12 2 also found an overly intensive search. The intensive activities
included low-level "buzzings" and "divebombings" of homes. 123 In
Mullen, helicopter pilots "buzzed" one defendant continuously as she
took an outdoor shower. 124 Another pilot hovered 100 feet above a de-
fendant's bedroom with an unhindered view of the room. 125 Other in-
stances included buzzing school children on their way home from
school 126 and following cars at a low altitude. 127  The court in Mullen
held that the helicopters were "no longer just surveying open fields, but
[were] deliberately looking into and invading peoples' homes and curti-
lage."' 128  On the other hand, in State v. Stachler 129 the court ruled that a
search is not overly intense when (1) the area observed by aerial surveil-
lance is not heavily populated, and (2) there is no danger posed by the
aircraft to the people below. 130
Aerial surveillance clearly has the ability to create constitutional
tension. As most cases involving aerial surveillance indicate, however,
118. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
119. Id. at 545, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
120. Id. at 543, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
121. Id. at 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
122. 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
123. Id. at 955.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 958.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 957.
129. 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
130. Stachler, 570 P.2d at 1328 n.4. See also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (fact that police had to fly over defendant's property twice did not constitute an
overly intense search which violated any reasonable expectation of privacy).
1987]
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police generally have not abused the observation technique as they did in
Mullen. Therefore, "intensity" is rarely a factor in a court's decision.
C. Speed of the Aircraft
The aircraft's speed during aerial surveillance may be an element in
a court's decision. This factor is usually relevant when the surveillance
involves the use of a helicopter, due to its low speed and ability to hover.
For example, the court noted low speed as a factor in overturning the
defendant's conviction in People v. Sneed 3 ' when the court recognized
that the surveillance helicopter had hovered over the defendant's prop-
erty in order to observe the suspected existence of marijuana plants.' 32
Another case involving low speed aerial passes was People v. Superior
Court for County of Los Angeles.' 33 Although a helicopter had flown
over the defendant's property at a speed of thirty miles per hour, the
court upheld the search as reasonable. 1 3  The court concluded that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance. " The small number of cases which cite low speed as a factor in
overturning convictions based on aerial surveillance indicates that this
type of maneuver is uncommon and is rarely considered as an important
factor in the determination of these cases.
D. Equipment Used During the Surveillance
An important factor in determining the reasonableness of a search
involves the use of various types of vision-enhancing and photographic
equipment.' 36 In Ciraolo,137 the Court upheld the use of photographs
taken from an airplane with a non-telephoto lens in order to obtain a
131. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
132. Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See also National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (helicopters hovering at very low altitudes while observ-
ing private activities of people's lives unconstitutionally intrusive); United States v. Broadhurst, 805
F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (aerial surveillance valid even where aircraft circled the area being
observed).
133. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974).
134. Id. at 838-39, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. The court held that the defendants had no reasonable
expectation of privacy for the storage of stolen auto parts in their backyard. Since Los Angeles
police have long provided helicopter patrol for crime prevention and for protection of citizens of the
city, the defendant had no reasonable expectation that stolen property would not be seen from an
aerial view when the property was openly visible from the air. In distinguishing Sneed, the court
held that the corral in Sneed was not subjected to regular air patrol. Id.
135. Id.
136. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). Police placed a "beeper" inside a
chloroform container sold to defendant. The Court stated:
[T]he use of the beeper to signal the presence of... [defendant's] automobile to the police
receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
[Vol. 23:259
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search warrant. 38 The Supreme Court also upheld in Dow Chemical the
use of aerial mapping equipment by EPA officials flying over the manu-
facturing facility. 39 The Court stated that "surveillance of private prop-
erty by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitu-
tionally proscribed absent a warrant."1 40  However, the Court distin-
guished the equipment which the photographer used, stating that "the
photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise con-
stitutional concerns." ' The Court also noted that the EPA officials
were afforded better, more detailed information than could have been
seen by the naked eye, but the degree to which vision was enhanced in
this case was not constitutionally prohibited.142
The use of binoculars may also be permissible. In State v.
Stachler,14 3 the defendant was convicted based on evidence obtained
through the use of binoculars in aerial observations." 4 The equipment
which the police used was not overly sophisticated and was incapable of
revealing overly detailed information."4 These cases indicate that aerial
observations aided by binoculars or the use of standard photographic
equipment are valid, but the use of highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment that are not generally available to the public might be
prohibited.46
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.
Id. See also Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1973) (use of binoculars by police did not violate fourth amendment restrictions); People v. Superior
Court for County of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (use of binoculars
by police did not violate the fourth amendment); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (police
use of search light to see cases of illegal liquor on the deck of a ship not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion; use of search light equated with use of field glass); United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289
(9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's land on seacoast border was continually observed by Coast Guard heli-
copters aided by sophisticated electronic equipment; therefore, the defendant had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from surveillance with such equipment, especially when the suspicious site
involved large-scale modifications to the land easily visible from the air: "'[p]ermissible techniques
of surveillance include more than just the five senses of officers and their unaided physical abili-
ties "') (quoting United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978)); United States v.
Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.) (although some observations were made by police with the aid of binocu-
lars, the search was not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
137. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
138. Id. at 1813.
139. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
140. Id. at 1826.
141. Id. at 1826-27.
142. Id. at 1827.
143. 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
144. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1325-26.
145. Id. at -' 570 P.2d at 1329.
146. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 (1986).
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E. Location and Nature of Property Under Surveillance
Courts consider the location and nature of the property observed
when determining whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The court in United States v. DeBacker '47 held that aerial sur-
veillance was justified because the police were barred from any ground-
level view of the defendant's property.148  In DeBacker, a wall of trees
blocked ground-level observations of the section of property on which
marijuana was suspected to be growing. Therefore, the court sanctioned
the officers' use of an aerial vantage point to effectively investigate. 49
When ground-level investigations are blocked, courts like those in
DeBacker and Ciraolo have upheld the constitutionality of aerial observa-
tions. Apparently courts recognize that police officers must be allowed
to use more than just ground-level observations in investigating sus-
pected illegal activity.
Although courts have made distinctions between urban and rural
areas under surveillance, 5° they have upheld both types, especially when
ground-level views are impossible.'' Similarly, the court in United
States v. Bassford 52 reasoned that there was "no sound basis for distin-
guishing between 'curtilage' and 'noncurtilage' areas equally visible from
the air."'153 The court further stated that trying to prohibit aerial obser-
vation of curtilage is impractical because it would be impossible to ob-
serve noncurtilage areas without also observing curtilage areas from an
147. 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
148. Id. at 1081. See also People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980). In Lashmett, a police officer 2400 feet in the air spotted stolen farm
machinery which was concealed from any ground-level observation. The court held that this obser-
vation was not a violation of defendant's privacy. Id. at -, 389 N.E.2d at 893-94. See also Dean v.
Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (because the
illegal marijuana plot growing on defendant's property was isolated from any ground-level observa-
tions, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when police had no other way to confirm
suspicions which arose from an anonymous tip); United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.)
(home was a half-mile from any public road and could only be crossed by a four-wheel drive vehicle),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987). But see United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir.
1986) (defendant had displayed a subjective expectation of privacy where defendant had enclosed the
marijuana in a greenhouse, fenced the property, and posted "no trespassing" signs; defendant had
gone to "great lengths ... to block all views of the interior of the greenhouse from every accessible
vantage point.").
149. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1079.
150. See People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973) (listed as one
factor in the determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy is the "location of the premises,
that is, whether in an urban or isolated area .... ").
151. See California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106
S. Ct. 1819 (1986) (ground-level observations blocked).
152. 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985), af'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909
(1987).
153. Id. at 1331.
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aerial vantage point.' 54
The size of the area covered by the crop is also a factor.' 55 Courts
have consistently held that people engaged in large agricultural pursuits
have no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance of
their crops.' 56  For example, in Dean v. Superior Court for County of
Nevada,' 7 the court decided that no one who cultivates a large area of
illegal crops has any reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial obser-
vation of those crops.' 58 In further support of aerial surveillance, the
court in State v. Stachler 159 held that the size of a crop area is not an
indication of a reasonable expectation of privacy.16° Apparently, no mat-
ter how small the crop area, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
when a person plants an illegal crop which can be seen from the air.161
The distinctive bright green color of marijuana also reduces any ex-
pectation of privacy because it can be easily spotted from overhead. 162 In
United States v. Bassford, 63 the court noted "the striking contrast be-
tween the color of the marijuana plots and the color of the surrounding
154. Id.
155. See People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). In striking down the
aerial surveillance as unconstitutional, the court noted that there were only two marijuana plants on
defendant's property. Id. at 539-40, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
156. See State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). The expectation of privacy was
an internal one, arising only from the fact that the marijuana crop was illegal. There was no reason-
able expectation of privacy arising out of the fact that defendant was engaged in agricultural pur-
suits. The court stated that persons engaged in agricultural pursuits do not expect privacy from
aerial observation. The court further stated that a person engaged in growing sweet potatoes or
bananas would not have an expectation of privacy from aerial observation that society would accept
as reasonable. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1328.
157. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
158. Id. at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (a person who grows a marijuana field half the size of a
football field with plants growing fifteen feet in height, arranged in neat rows along irrigation
ditches, has exhibited no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance).
159. 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
160. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1328.
161. See id. (no person engaging in agricultural pursuits has any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy when the crop can be seen from a reasonable height).
162. See United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1986) (police acting on tip that
defendant was growing marijuana in a greenhouse conducted aerial observations at an altitude of
1000 feet which revealed the existence of plants "of a color and height consistent with marijuana.").
See also People v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1974) (police officers conducting aerial observations clearly spotted a bright red automobile
hood in defendant's backyard); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (police officers clearly
saw defendant standing in the vestibule of her home with evidence of illegal activity); United States
v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (police could easily see large-scale modifications of ranch
landscape, leading them to further suspicion of illegal smuggling activity).
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flora .. . ."I' The court stated that "[i]t would be unreasonable to ex-
pect that the attention of persons flying over the area would not be drawn
to the distinctively different coloration of the marijuana vegetation
. "... 165 The court recognized that certain characteristics of a marijuana
crop negate any reasonable expectation of privacy.
F. Frequency of Other Flights Over the Area
When the property in question is located in an area where flights are
frequent, the owner of such property has a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy. In United States v. Allen, 16 6 the defendant's property was located
on the United States seacoast border over which Coast Guard helicopters
frequently flew for law enforcement purposes. 167 The court in Allen held
that due to the frequent Coast Guard flights over the area, "any reason-
able person, cognizant of the ranch's proximity to the coastline and the
Coast Guard's well-known function of sea-coast patrol and surveillance,"
could have no reasonable expectation of privacy from such surveil-
lance.168 In State v. Stachler,169 the State offered evidence that National
Guard helicopters, as well as crop dusters and other small aircraft, occa-
sionally flew over the region.170 The court held that if the defendant
could have shown that helicopter flights over the area were very rare, his
expectation of privacy would have been given more weight.' 7' In People
v. Sneed,172 however, the fact that the defendant's land was frequently
seen from the air by crop dusters and mosquito abatement helicopters did
not reduce the defendant's expectation of privacy from aerial observa-
tion.173 Most courts do not follow the Sneed reasoning, however, and
logically conclude that the frequency of air travel over a defendant's
property is a factor which reduces the expectation of privacy.
G. Measures Used to Display Expectation of Privacy
The two-part test for fourth amendment analysis set forth in Katz
164. Id. at 1331.
165. Id.
166. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980).
167. Id. at 1286.
168. Id. at 1290.
169. 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
170. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1328.
171. Id.
172. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
173. Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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requires courts to consider the defendant's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. The Supreme Court in both Dow Chemical and Ciraolo considered
the defendant's efforts to maintain privacy. In both cases, the defendants
took measures to totally block ground-level views of the property.1
7 4
Furthermore, in Dow Chemical, the defendant displayed an effort to min-
imize even aerial observation of the manufacturing facility.175 In both
cases, however, the Court held that although the defendants met the re-
quirement of having a subjective expectation of privacy, they failed to
show that the privacy expectation was recognized by society.' 76  The
Court held that society is not willing to recognize as reasonable an expec-
tation of privacy from aerial surveillance under these circumstances.1
77
H. Evidence of Entry Onto Defendant's Property
In determining the defendant's expectation of privacy, several courts
consider important evidence of open entry onto a defendant's property
by people other than the defendant. The court in Dean v. Superior Court
for County of Nevada178 recognized that evidence of a well-worn footpath
which led to the field in question reduced the defendant's expectation of
privacy. 179 In Dean, officers "made two trips afoot, traversing unfenced,
unposted woodland and following dirt paths."' ° Similarly, the court in
People v. Sneed"'8 recognized that the existence of public or private
walkways adjacent to a defendant's property could reduce his expecta-
tion with respect to those persons who use the walkway.' 82 Clearly, the
rationale behind considering evidence of entry onto defendant's property
174. The defendant in Dow Chemical had an elaborate security system barring ground-level in-
trusions. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1820 (1986). The defendant in
Ciraolo built two fences which barred ground-level observation. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct.
1809, 1810 (1986).
175. In addition to ground-level security, Dow had a company policy that required anyone who
spotted low-flying aircraft to identify the craft and report it to security officials who would further
investigate the purpose of the flight. 106 S. Ct. at 1828 (Powell, J., concurring in Part III and
dissenting).
176. See Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
177. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. In several cases, property owners posted their land. Because
they are directed to ground-level intrusions, however, signs which forbid trespassing do not render
aerial observations unconstitutional. United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich.
1980). See also United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980).
178. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
179. Id. at 115, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
180. Id. at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
181. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
182. Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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by people other than the defendant is to show that such a defendant has
no legitimate expectation of privacy.
I. Randomness of the Search
A final factor in determining the reasonableness of a warrantless
aerial observation is whether the surveillance was random and unfocused
or made pursuant to a reasonable suspicion and focused on a particular
area. The Supreme Court in California v. Ciraolo 83 indicated that one
important factor in upholding the aerial surveillance under the circum-
stances was that the search was focused on one lot and made pursuant to
a tip which was followed by a ground-level search.' 84 The search in
Ciraolo was not a random search of a large urban area for any indications
of illegal activity; rather, it focused only on the respondent's property. 18 5
Similarly, in United States v. Allen, 186 the court stated that "[i]f there is
some justification for concentrating a surveillance on a particular place,
as opposed to random investigation to discover criminal activity, that
factor is weighed in the balance and contributes to justification for the
surveillance."187
Like Ciraolo and Allen, most cases which validate aerial surveillance
involve investigating officers who were not acting randomly, but who
were acting on a tip188 or on evidence of illegal activity. 189 By limiting
aerial surveillance to situations where the search is not a random scan of
all property in an area, but focuses on reasonable suspicions of illegal
activity, the intrusiveness of aerial observations is minimized.
V. CONCLUSION
Crime prevention clearly satisfies important governmental and soci-
etal interests. At the core of crime prevention is the ability of police to
search out and detect criminal activity. By using certain aerial surveil-
lance techniques, police can detect some criminal activity which would
otherwise be protected from ground-level observation. In spite of the
importance of crime prevention, the government cannot use its police
183. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
184. Id. at 1811.
185. Id.
186. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 1290.
188. 106 S. Ct. at 1810 (1986).
189. Allen, 633 F.2d at 1286 (9th Cir. 1980). Immediately after purchasing suspect coastal prop-
erty, Allen terminated the previous owner's policy of allowing fishermen and hunters to cross
through his land into adjacent federal lands. Id.
[Vol. 23:259
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss2/3
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
power to intrude upon an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.
The question, therefore, is whether a person has a legitimate expectation
of privacy from aerial surveillance and what factors reduce this
expectation.
Although the broad constitutional principles behind the prohibition
of warrantless search and seizure are firmly established, the specific topic
of aerial surveillance is relatively new. California v. Ciraolo and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States mark the first time that the Supreme Court
has addressed the issue of warrantless aerial surveillance. Because of the
relative infancy of the issue, no clear patterns have evolved as to how
courts will decide whether a warrantless aerial search is constitutional.
In viewing the circumstances of cases involving aerial observations,
courts must use the basic fourth amendment balancing test. Warrantless
aerial surveillance must be weighed on a scale of fourth amendment rea-
sonableness, with the government's law enforcement objective balanced
against the loss of privacy caused by the government action. Because a
person's expectation of privacy is reduced outdoors, and because police
power is constantly checked by legislatures and courts, the balancing test
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